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THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF
YUGOSLAVIA IN THE PROTECTION OF
BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
By DIMITRIJE KULic:::
The development of judicial review and protection of constitutionality in
Yugoslavia is fairly recent. It was instituted 18 years after the end of World
War II, when Yugoslavia had already firmly defined her own approach to
the evolution of the state.
The social and political relations which have developed particularly
during the past twenty years indicate, to an increasing degree, the necessity
and the importance of judicial control of the constitution.1
Yugoslavia's independence and democracy has required an effective
system of protecting constitutional rights, without which the existence of a
legal state is unimaginable. It became evident that this type of control was
absolutely necessary under conditions of developing self-management
democracy and the system of social self-management as it exists in Yugo-
slavia today. Control and protection of constitutionality in this country during
the past 8 years since the establishment of constitutional courts in the Feder-
ation (the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia) and one republican constitu-
tional court in each republic (six republican constitutional courts) as well as
one constitutional court department in the province (2 departments) has been
effected along the following principles:
1. The constitution is the supreme legal and social document of the
country. All functions of authority and public authorization, as well
as the function of the political party, emanate from the Constitution
and cannot be acquired by any other document. Similarly, each and
every function of authority and public authorization can only be
effected as provided for in the Constitution.
2. The federation, republics, provinces and communes are all equitable
communities in the sight of the Constitution, and they effect their
jurisdiction and functions exclusively on the basis of the Constitution.
Therefore, none of them are hierarchically superior or subordinated
to any other. The legal system cannot be created or regulated arbi-
trarily. Therefore, the federation, republics, provinces and communes
are, in their mutual relations, equitable larger or smaller communities.
The obligations of the smaller communities in relationship to the
larger ones, the federation and the republics, stem exclusively from
the Constitution and the Laws of the Federation, and/or republics.
All legal documents must be in accordance with the Yugoslav Con-
stitution.
* Professor, Faculty of Law in NiS.
1The spread of judicial control of constitutionality is especially prevalent after the
famous case of Madison v. Marbury (1803), 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (U.S.S.C.).
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3. The control of constitutionality within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body, the parliament of Yugoslavia, was relinquished in 1963 with
the adoption of the Constitution now in force, and the establishment
of constitutional courts which are the only bodies authorized to rule
on the validity of a law or act.
The main reason for a solution of this kind was that the legislator cannot
be the judge of his own affairs. The control of constitutionality must be
entrusted to an unbiased, neutral and qualified body, as the guardian and
"servant" of the Constitution, the only one officially authorized in the country
to state what is constitutional and what is unconstitutional. This is the
constitutional court, which by organization and function, should be specially
concentrated and directed towards the important functions of the control and
protection of the Constitution and the Law, and in which the stated ights of
citizens and social self-management, as the basis of democracy in the country,
hold the central place.
Holding this function of control and protection of constitutionality, and
protecting the Constitution as an objective document and an objective right,
the constitutional court also acts increasingly as a political body for the
protection of the citizens' basic rights, thus helping to strengthen and stabilize
the legal and social system.
However, what is especially interesting in the contemporary judicial
review of constitutionality is the Yugoslav Constitutional Court's jurisdiction
in ex officio proceedings. The competence to proceed on its own initiative
has invested the constitutional judiciary with a place of exceptional importance
in regulating social relations; as a result, the constitutional courts do not
emerge only as organs of repression. They have not been left in the classical
position of having to wait for the initiative of competent subjects who would,
according to the Constitution, be able to initiate proceedings. The Constitution
has invested the Constitutional Court with this right and thus, has created
broadbased possibilities for the Constitutional Court to start proceedings on
its own initiative against unconstitutional actions.
Most of the cases brought before the Constitutional Court on the issue
of constitutionality and legality, pertained to constitutional rights of social
self-management. This was to have been expected even at the time when
constitutional judiciary was instituted, as many centres of decision-making
within the self-managing system used to pass legislation which not infrequently
failed to conform with the Constitution.
On this occasion, I have found it useful to present only a few cases
brought before the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia pertaining to the
protection of the basic constitutional rights of citizens.
Protection of the Right of Private Ownership -Annulment of the Law on
Nationalizing Building Land
One of the first major decisions of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia
is certainly the one annuling the regulations passed after April 7, 1965, which,
by the Law on the Nationalization of Buildings and Land for Lease, national-
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ized building land, thus violating the right of private ownership guaranteed
by the Yugoslav Constitution.2
Prior to this court decision, many citizens, work organizations and
institutions in Yugoslavia had appealed to the Constitutional Court of the
Federation, requesting an investigation of the constitutionality of the Law on
Nationalization (and other regulations passed on the basis of the latter) and an
annulment of all decisions unconstitutionally violating the interests and rights
of citizens and other legal entities pertaining to the right of private ownership.
The Constitutional Court accepted these initiatives and, by virtue of office,
initiated special ex officio proceedings.
During its proceedings in this dispute, the Constitutional Court of
Yugoslavia established the existence of unconstitutional regulations on the
nationalization of building ground3 and ruled that the citizens' complaints
were justified. It was considered that these laws could not constitute a basis
for the nationalization of building land. The ruling of the Constitutional Court
annuled the regulations of the executive councils of the republics Montenegro,
Croatia and Serbia wherein localities and districts had been determined,
to be classified as towns and settlements of an urban character, thus, expanding
building areas. On the basis of the judicial review proceedings, the Constitu-
tional Court of Yugoslavia established that the executive councils of these
three republics had, even after the adoption of the 1963 Constitution, invoked
the provisions of article 34 of the Law on the Nationalization of Building
Land, on the basis of which certain places were to be considered as towns
and urban settlements, so that such land had to be nationalized.
The starting point of the Constitutional Court was that, according to the
Yugoslav Constitution, the right to private property could not be abolished.
Thus, the laws passed by the executive councils of the republics, which
effectively nationalized private property, were contrary to the Yugoslav
Constitution.
The Constitutional Court based its decision on the ground that the
provisions of the Law on Nationalization4 differed in the restriction of owner-
ship rights for building sites, from the provisions of the Yugoslav Constitution,
which gives no foundations for the abolition of private property rights.
According to interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the Yugoslav Consti-
tution makes a distinction between farming, forest and building land and in
this sense, determines different restrictions on the scope of private ownership
rights of each of these kinds of land. The indisputable basis for the correctness
of the ruling of the Constitutional Court is contained in the provisions of the
Yugoslav Constitution which guarantees the right to private ownership of
arable land. This provision of the Constitution runs: "Agricultural workers
are guaranteed the right of ownership of arable farm land to an area up to
2 Ruling of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia.
3 The Articles in point were Art. 34 and 35 of the Law on the Nationalization of
Buildings for Lease and Building Land, which had been passed by the Federal Assembly.
4Art. 34 and 35, Law on Nationalization of Buildings For Lease and Building Land.
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10 hectares per household". 5 The Yugoslav Constitution also offers the possi-
bility that the Law may provide for the right of ownership of other land,
and in particular, the conditions whereby agricultural workers may hold the
right of ownership of land which is not arable.6 In this way the Yugoslav
Constitution left no possibility for restricting arable farming land not exceeding
an area of 10 hectares per household; this represents a constitutional guarantee
of ownership of this property.
The extension of urban areas to include land which is arable and which
is otherwise the private property of agricultural workers, i.e. declaring them
construction land, de facto constituted the nationalization of private farming
land and its transfer to social property. Thus, according to the ruling of the
Constitutional Court, the republican executive councils of three republics
(Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia) as well as the assembly of the autonomous
provinces, districts and communes, by determining as such and/or expanding
building areas, effected an unconstitutional action, namely abolishing the right
to private property as guaranteed by the Constitution. The Constitutional
Court refused to accept the claims of the various participants in this proceed-
ing who justified the nationalization of private land by arguing that it was
necessary for the privately owned land in point to become building land and
so social property, in the interests of urban development. While admitting
urban requirements in this respect, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia
protected the basic rights which are guaranteed citizens by adhering to its
decision that such measures could be taken, and such interests met, only in
a manner not conflicting with the Constitution. Therefore the Court retained
its stand that such a measure constituted an attack on the private property
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Unconstitutionality of the Law on Expropriation
According to the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, con-
stitutional property rights7 were likewise violated by the Law on Expropria-
tion.8 According to the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, just
as this federal law was unconstitutional, the provisions of the republican laws
were equally unconstitutional. The provisions of the federal law proved to
be unconstitutional as regards the expropriation of land.
During the past few years, citizens and other legal entities lodged
frequent complaints about the determination of compensation for expropriated
real estate. The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia therefore had to deal not
only with the problem of nationalization but also that of expropriation. In
these cases, expropriation emerged as a specific form of unconstitutional
S Art. 21 of the Constitution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (SFRY),
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications Inc., 1972).
6 Art. 21, para. 3 of the Constitution of SFRY.
7 Art. 25 of the Constitution of SFRY.
8Art. 35,43 and 47, Law on Expropriation.
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impounding of private property. The conversion to social property was at
variance with art. 25 of the Constitution of SFRY which states,
Real estate owned by citizens and juristic persons may be expropriated against
equitable compensation, or ownership rights may be restricted, if so required by
general interest as spelled out by federal statute.
The right of ownership of objects of special cultural value may be restricted under
statute, if so required by general interest.
The practice which violated the citizens' real estate rights was the con-
spicuously low compensation to those whose land had been expropriated for
housing or other construction; the question of adequate compensation emerged
as a serious constitutional issue within the framework of so called indirect
control, as a repressive form of control of constitutionality.9 In this context
the Supreme Court of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia'0 initiated proceedings
with the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia11 to decide the constitutionality
of the Law on Expropriation.
In considering this disputed issue as one of particular importance in
making its final ruling, the Constitutional Court considered the criteria invoked
in the determination of compensation for expropriated land of citizens.
According to the ruling of the Constitutional Court the unconstitutionality of
the Law on Expropriation lay in art. 35 which, in determining a citizen's
compensation for expropriated land, took as the basis only the registered
revenue on actual land (from a threefold to tenfold annual revenue), deter-
mining specifically that compensation could not exceed the market price of
the land. As regards the compensation for expropriation of privately owned
buildings, the unconstitutional law (art. 43) determined as compensation only
the value of the material obtained after the building was demolished, and
admitted only in exceptional cases the insignificant costs of demolition.
The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia declared this Law of Federal
Assembly as unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. Compensation for expropriated real estate according to art. 25 of
the Constitution of SFRY, as affected by the Law on Expropriation,
was inadequate. The essence of adequate compensation requires
absolute indemnification of the owner of privately owned real estate
and of the vehicle of the right to use real estate owned by the society.
In this dispute, the Constitutional Court adopted the view that in
assessing compensation one cannot take into account only a single
criterion (the value of material after the building's demolition) and
that the solution to the question must be sought in the assessment of
numerous subjective and objective factors on which the determination
of a just compensation is made in each individual case according to
9 Yugoslav constitutional judiciary knows exclusively that the repressive control of
constitutionality, and preventive control has not been accepted in this country. Abstract
and concrete control of constitutionality should, on the one hand, safeguard the independ-
ence of the legislative process, and on the other, should contribute to the complete and
effective responsibility of the legislator in passing laws.
10 A similar motion for estimating constitutionality was also submitted by the Workers
Council of the Glass Factory in Pardcin (Socialist Republic of Serbia).
11 Ruling U-68/66 of June 28, 1967.
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its merits. The Constitutional Court did not accept the excuse that
expropriation had been effected in the "general" interest.
2. In determining adequate compensation for expropriated farm land,
the Constitutional Court adopted the view that the register revenue
of land cannot be the sole and exclusive criterion in complying with
the intention of art. 25 of the Constitution of SFRY. According to
the view of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, revenue from
farming land is, among others, dependent on average yields from
various kinds of land over a longer period of time. In the opinion
of the court, the register revenue of the land should be taken as the
yardstick for income tax liabilities on farming land. Therefore the
register revenue differs from the actual revenue according to the
private owner's earnings from his farm land. The elements which
affect the value of farm land include the value of investments, the
location of the land, the other assets of the owner, etc.
In determining an adequate compensation for expropriated buildings
owned by citizens, the Constitutional Court adopted the view that one cannot
consider as adequate compensation the value of its material after the building
has been demolished, but must include the labour invested in it and the value
of the material which is incomparably higher when the building is being
constructed than after it has been demolished.
For the aforementioned reasons the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia
declared the Law on Expropriation, as a law passed by the Federal Assembly,
to be unconstitutional. 12
Protection of Freedom of Movement (The Maribor Case)
Late in 1967, a decision of the communal assembly in Maribor (Republic
of Slovenia) attracted the attention of the Yugoslav public, and the decision
has now come to be known in Yugoslavia as the "Maribor Case". The
communal assembly in Maribor passed a regulation on December 28th
restricting the movements of children and minors under 16. According to
this decision, (art. 12), parents and guardians were bound to see to it that
children and minors under 16, should not be on the street or in public places
after 8:00 p.m. from November to March, and after 9:00 p.m. from April
to October, and that sports and other organizations engaged with youth should
so arrange their work so that it would end by these times. The same regulation
(art. 14) forbade children and minors without adult accompaniment from
attending cinema and theatre performances, concerts and other kinds of
12 During the proceedings of control of constitutionality of the Law on Expropriation
before the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, the Federal Assembly accepted the con-
clusions (ruling) of the Court that the law was unconstitutional and according to and in
keeping with the Constitution of Yugoslavia, it immediately approached the alteration
to comply with the Constitution. The Assembly passed the law amending and supplementing
the Law on Expropriation, by which the unconstitutional articles 35, 43 and 47 of the law
were dovetailed with art. 25 of the Yugoslav Constitution. At its session of March 20,
1968, having declared the said law not complied with the Constitution and that the ruling
of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia had been accepted, further proceedings in this
disputed case were halted.
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entertainment, with the exception of performances for the youth organized
by youth or other social organizations. After 8:00 p.m. minors were not
allowed to remain, alone or accompanied by adults, at performances, enter-
tainments or night clubs whose programmes and frequenters had an obvious
negative effect on the education of youth, nor were they permitted after this
time "to loiter unnecessarily in the streets or in restaurants."'13
The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia at the request of the Constitu-
tional Court of Slovenia, and after public discussions, decided first to have
this case considered by the Constitutional Court of Slovenia in order to
investigate the constitutionality of the legislation. That Republic ruled that
the legislation in question did not violate the constitutional law of the
Republic of Slovenia.
However, within its jurisdiction, and assessing the concord of this
decision with the Constitution and Law of the Federation, the Constitutional
Court of Yugoslavia adopted the opposite view, it accepted the contention
that the case in point was a flagrant violation of art. 51 of the Constitution
of SFRY as this decision restricted the freedom and rights of citizens.
Art. 51 states:
Citizens shall enjoy freedom of movement and abode.
Restriction of the freedom of movement or abode may be ordered by law, but only
in order to ensure the conduct of criminal proceedings, to prevent the spread of
contagious diseases, to protect public order, or when the interests of the country's
defence so require.
The first reason cited by the Constitutional Court was that the action
of the Maribor assembly restricted people's freedom and rights and that a
decision of this kind reflected "the relationship of the society and man, the
community and the individual, freedom and coercion." Secondly, the antisocial
phenomena and other deviations in the behaviour of minors, could not be
resolved without an elaborate and coordinated system of educational and
other cultural and political measures. The third basis of the decision was that
prohibition and prescription of punitive measures infringe upon a certain
sphere of human rights, including those of the youth, who are as equal as
other citizens in the eyes of the Constitution and the Law. The Court also
stated that restricting freedom and prescribing punitive measures as "socially
justified" cannot be effected contrary to the Constitution, nor can they be
issued outside the competence of the organs which, according to the Con-
stitution and the Law, are solely authorized to prescribe such measures.
It was also held that it is the right and duty of the commune to maintain
public law and order on its territory, just as it is the right of the commune
to take corresponding measures to protect minors. However, these rights and
13 The initiative for starting proceedings before the Constitutional court of Yugo-
slavia was made by numerous youth and cultural institutions -the editorial office of
the youth publication "Miadost", the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Youth Union,
the Federal Council for Education and Culture, the Institute of Criminology in Ljubijana,
the Society for Youth Education and the Society of Friends of the Youth in Slovenia,
the Association of Pedagogic Societies in Yugoslavia, the Council for the Education and
Welfare of Children in Yugoslavia, the Central Committee of the Youth Union of Serbia
and the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade.
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duties of the commune and the educational aims it wants to attain, can only
be effected within the framework provided for by the Constitution.
In the legal assessment of this decision, the Constitutional Court of
Yugoslavia reached the conclusion that this kind of decision represented a
restriction of freedom of movement not only for children but for minors
under 16. According to the Yugoslav Constitution, freedom of movement is
one of the basic freedoms of citizens. Restriction of this freedom, according
to the Constitution can only be effected in exceptional cases; to ensure the
successful conducting of criminal proceedings, to prevent the spread of con-
tagious diseases, to protect public order or in the interests of the country's
defence. Even assuming that minors were a danger to public order and peace,
such a decision could only be adopted by passing a law and not by a ruling
of the communal assembly.
Distinguishing between the guaranteed freedom of adults and those of
minors is contrary to the basic principles of the country's democratic and
political system and the Constitution which, in granting these rights, makes
no distinction between age categories. Taking as a starting point the principle
of human equality, the Constitution of Yugoslavia, does not view the freedom
of movement of minors any differently than the freedom of movement of adults.
The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia did not accept the position of
the communal assembly in Maribor, that its decision did not violate the
Constitution, because minors are under the special protection of the social
community, and that parents are entitled to and responsible for the upbringing
and education of their children.14 The Court did not admit the reasons of
the municipal assembly maintaining that they have no connection with the
constitutional principles of freedom of movement of citizens.15
The ruling of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia in this dispute is
significant as from the standpoint of the Basic Law on Minor Offenses and
from the viewpoint of art. 49 para. 1, of the Constitution of SFRY which
states,
No one shall be punished for any act which before its commission was not defined
as a punishable offence by statute or a legal provision based on statute, or for
which no penalty was threatened.
In this connection, the Constitutional Court ruled that the decision on public
order and peace (especially art. 12 of this decision) was also illogical in
conception, as "loitering" is only forbidden for minors under 16, at a certain
14 Art. 57, para. 2 of the Constitution of the SFRY states, "Minors deprived of
parental care and other persons unable to provide for themselves and take care of their
rights shall enjoy special protection of the community." Art. 58, para. 3 states, "Parents
shall have the right and duty to raise and educate their children."
Is The ruling of the Constitutional Court in this dispute runs: "It has been established
that art. 12 para. 2 and art. 14 of the Decision on public law and order in the Maribor
Commune ("Modovcinksi uradni vesnik" za obcine Dravograd, Sloveni, Gradec in Slo-
venska Bistrica" ar. 1/68, 2/68 and 20/68) are not in conformity with the Yugoslav
Constitution and with art. 2 para. 1 of the Basic Law on Minor Offenses; Provisions of art.
12 para. 2 and art. 14 of the said decision are therefore rescinded as well as provisions of
art. 17 para. 1, point 7 and art. 18, para. 2 point 1 and noint 2 of the Decision..."
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time and in a certain way; this would mean that "loitering" is not prohibited
for adults, that it is permitted by day, and permitted in places other than
the street.
The three cases recorded above are only some of the many disputes
the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia was called upon to settle. The present
experience of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia has indicated the need
to give detailed consideration to its future function and jurisdiction. Yugoslav
jurists, particularly those directly engaged with this kind of material, have
great interest in further developing and advancing judicial control of con-
stitutionality. In this context, serious work is already under way both in
changing the constitutions of the Federation and the republics as well as on
enacting some new laws in connection with the pending changes in the juris-
diction of constitutional courts.
The need for a broader and more important role and function of con-
stitutional courts stems from the following:
1. During the past few years (especially between 1968 and 1971),
Yugoslavia has approached major constitutional changes and has
passed 42 constitutional amendments to the 1963 Constitution of
SFRY. These constitutional amendments had, as their most essential
aim, the expansion of the legislative competences of the republics and
provinces in federal policy making; the jurisdiction of the federation
has thus been considerably reduced.
2. The constitutional amendments have likewise resulted in changes in
the process of legislation. The Federation has retained jurisdiction
mainly over questions of foreign affairs and national defence and the
interests of a united market. Almost the entire legislative competence
over sovereignty switched to the republics; the logical consequence
is that the function of the republican constitutional courts has gained
in significance.
3. The constitutional courts must attain greater efficiency in their actions
in order to effect a more consistent application and respect of the
Constitution and the Law in order to prevent unconstitutional laws.
4. The subjects, so far, who have initiated proceedings before the Con-
stitutional Court, have been state organs and social organizations,
either as interested or accused parties in proceedings. Citizens whose
constitutional rights have been infringed upon have not been able
directly to initiate such proceedings. They could either entrust this
initiative to organs competent to start proceedings, or could appeal
to the Constitutional Court, which could then decide whether or not
it would accept the request to commence an action. If the Constitu-
tional Court decided that there were grounds for initiating proceed-
ings, it would do so by ex officio procedure. However, the more
consistent protection of man's basic constitutional rights, indicates
the need for creating full possibilities for the citizens to initiate such
proceedings themselves in cases when their basic constitutional rights
have been infringed.
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5. Within the Yugaslav reality the following provision of the Yugoslav
Constitution is acquiring more and more importance:
The courts follow and study social relations and phenomena of interest in effecting
their functions and sponsor motions for preventing socially dangerous and
deleterious phenomena and for consolidating legality. 16
The essence of this provision of the Constitution is directed towards
creating a new dimension in the jurisdiction of courts, particularly
constitutional courts. The Yugoslav Constitution insists on a more
marked, complete and organized function of the Constitutional Court
in following and studying social relations and problems of importance
in protecting constitutionality and legality. The Court as a whole
would within its permanent function, the classical function of pro-
nouncing judgment and resolving concrete disputes, operate increas-
ingly as an analyst and observer of social phenomena and events of
interest in the protection of the Constitution and the Law; its function
would not be restricted solely to the judging of concrete disputes.
As a political body, the Constitutional Court would, on the basis of
its own practice and that of other judicial organs and scientific study,
from time to time draw attention to social phenomena, their mani-
festations and causes, thus emerging in a broader preventive function
of protecting constitutional rights.
16 Art. 135 of the Constitution of SFRY.
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